Find SIM Details by Number or CNIC
Enter a mobile number or your 13-digit CNIC to check the registered SIM details instantly — free and within PTA rules.
Pakistan’s SIM database is never truly “fresh” — it’s a patchwork of real-time SVMS (biometric) data, stale IMSI/IMEI device traces, historical NADRA records, and leaked 2013 pre-biometric snapshots. Tools claiming to sell you a “fresh” or “live” SIM database are almost always reselling historical data with cosmetic refresh intervals. A genuinely real-time SIM owner lookup in Pakistan exists only in three forms: PTA’s official 667/668 SMS services, the cnic.sims.pk portal for your own CNIC, and law enforcement channels into PTA’s biometric system. Everything else is historical inference. For a broader overview of how Pakistan’s SIM verification ecosystem works, see SIM information Pakistan.
Why SIM databases age so quickly
A “fresh” database is only fresh for the moment it’s compiled. Within 24 hours, thousands of SIM transfers happen — reassignments due to verified name changes, MNP port-outs between operators, new activations, and formal releases. Within a week, re-verification campaigns add new biometric flags to existing SIMs. Within a month, the database is systematically stale on a non-trivial percentage of records.
The clearest evidence: compare your own CNIC in a leaked pre-2013 database with what 668 returns today. The leaked records will show SIMs you haven’t held in a decade, won’t show recent numbers you activated last year, and will have ownership names from before your marriage or legal name change. The legal reason is that PTA doesn’t distribute its live biometric registry to anyone. Operators and PTA itself see the real-time data; leaked or purchased databases cannot.
Where do “fresh SIM databases” actually come from?
The supply chains break down into six categories, all of them incomplete or compromised:
- 2013 NADRA/PTA leak copies — the massive pre-biometric dataset from when Pakistan activated mandatory biometric SIM verification. Still circulated on some data-broker sites and underground forums. These copies are 11+ years stale, heavily inaccurate on current bindings, and in some cases deliberately corrupted during the original leak (ownership names scrambled, CNICs truncated). For a detailed breakdown of why this dataset is so unreliable today, see Pak SIM Data official. Don’t buy these.
- Operator franchise list scrapes — dealers’ databases of customers they’ve personally activated, then scraped or purchased from insiders. These cover only the fraction of SIMs activated through that specific franchise and are frozen at the date of scraping. No ongoing updates. Usually sold as “fresh data” even though they’re months or years out of date.
- IMSI/IMEI trace logs — device and network identifiers from telecom network infrastructure. These show that a device was on a network at a given time but don’t inherently identify the human subscriber. Sellers package IMSI traces with purchased ownership guesses (“our algorithms matched this IMSI to an owner”) and sell it as a SIM database. It’s largely nonsense.
- Aggregated verification-campaign records — when PTA or an operator runs a re-verification campaign, some records escape into data-broker channels. These are genuinely recent (30–60 days old) and somewhat accurate, but only for SIMs that were flagged for re-verification. SIMs outside that batch are missing entirely. The completeness is maybe 40–60% of the national base, and the rest of the database is back-filled with older data.
- Operator internal system exports — rarely, an insider at an operator exports a snapshot of that operator’s subscriber base. These are genuinely fresh for that operator but are single-network only; the other four operators’ data is back-filled from older sources. Detected exports are investigated by PTA’s cyber unit; distributing them carries felony risk.
- Algorithmically guessed updates — sellers take an old database and apply fuzzy-matching to newly available ownership record sources (Facebook profiles, Instagram handles, property registrations, court records). The “freshness” is just repackaging. The accuracy is low because the core data matching is inference, not observation.
None of these is a “live” or “real-time” database in the sense that matters for accuracy. All of them are historical plus inference.
Real-time SIM owner lookup: What actually exists
Three mechanisms in Pakistan give you accurate, current SIM ownership data:
1. Your own CNIC — official channels
PTA offers two official services for checking SIMs registered on your own CNIC. Both are genuinely real-time against PTA’s biometric system:
- 668 SMS — send your CNIC, receive an immediate count of SIMs per network. Returns the current state as of that second.
- cnic.sims.pk portal — log in with OTP verification, see individual numbers, activation dates, and biometric status. Updated in real-time from PTA’s backend.
2. 667 for the current SIM
Text MNP to 667 from any SIM.
Receive the registered owner name and masked CNIC.
This queries PTA’s biometric record for that specific number in real-time.
It’s accurate because it’s coming directly from the authoritative source.
For the full walkthrough and sample responses per network, see the
dedicated 667 method page.
3. Law enforcement into PTA
Police investigations, court orders, FIA Cyber Crime Wing requests, and bank KYC verification all route through PTA’s official law-enforcement liaison. The queries return live biometric data directly from the SVMS system. Accuracy is complete because they’re seeing the same database that operators see. Access is restricted to documented institutional channels only. For context on how these channels work in practice, see SIM details by number.
Everything else is a copy, a trace, or a guess.
Identifying stale data in a purchased database
If someone offers to sell you a “fresh SIM database,” you can immediately identify it as stale by checking these markers:
- Creation date older than 30 days — automatically stale. SIMs listed are either wrong now or missing now.
- Claims of “regular updates” with no proof — this is standard seller language. Real proof would be weekly dumps with dated file names and matching checksums. The absence of this proves the database is static between purchase and resale.
- Pre-2016 records anywhere in the dataset — these are lifted from the 2013 leak or earlier. Most SIMs from 2013–2015 are either inactive now or re-verified under different names. The presence of old records is a sign the entire dataset is a patchwork.
- Coverage claims of “all five operators” — genuinely comprehensive SIM databases are impossible without operator-level access. Sellers claiming comprehensive coverage are back-filling from multiple stale sources. Compare a sample of 100 claimed numbers against 667 or cnic.sims.pk for the ones you can verify; the mismatch rate will be high.
- Pricing that’s “too good” — a genuinely current, comprehensive SIM database would be expensive because it’s stolen or leaked. If the seller is asking 1,000–5,000 rupees for “all SIMs,” it’s recycled old data being re-marketed.
The technical accuracy of “fresh” claims
Sellers often make technical claims about their data’s freshness that sound credible but are misleading:
“Live database matching” — they claim to match SIM numbers against “live” operator networks. What they actually do is query IMSI/IMEI identifiers and try to infer ownership. The IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is real-time observable but doesn’t include ownership; the inference step is guesswork based on historical data. The result is not live; it’s a guess based on old data. See live SIM tracker for what a legitimate real-time SIM check actually looks like.
“Real-time operator API” — operators don’t expose real-time SIM ownership APIs to private individuals. Some sellers claim to have them, which would be a massive regulatory breach. They don’t. What they might have is a reverse-proxy cache of occasional operator endpoints used for KYC checks, which gives them 24–48 hours of lag, not real-time.
“Biometric verification status included” — only PTA’s SVMS system knows real-time biometric status. Private databases can’t have this unless they’re exfiltrated from PTA, which is a Section 6 PECA breach. The presence of claimed biometric status in a purchased database is a red flag that the seller is misrepresenting old data.
Privacy and legal risk of “fresh” databases
Purchasing a SIM database in Pakistan carries specific risks:
- PECA 2016 Section 6 — unauthorised access to a computer system or data is a criminal offence. If the database is leaked or stolen, possession and use of it is an offence on your part independent of the original leak. “It was leaked” is not a defence.
- FIA investigation trigger — FIA’s Cyber Crime Wing has been actively investigating resale and use of leaked SIM databases in cases involving stalking, harassment, and fraud. Buying and using a leaked database puts you in the investigation pipeline if a victim complains.
- Operator liability — each of the five operators has legal claims against misuse of its customer data. In cases of fraud, harassment, or impersonation, the operator may join the investigation and pursue civil damages. Operator pages: Jazz, Zong, Telenor, Ufone, SCO.
- Data broker linkage — buying from a data broker links your payment and identity to the original leak. If PTA or FIA traces the leak source, they follow the sales chain. This has happened in past investigations.
When might a “fresh” database seem necessary?
The common justifications don’t hold up:
“I need to verify marketing numbers” — use 667 (sending MNP from the specific number) to verify. It’s free and legal.
“I need to check for fraud or scam numbers” — file an FIR with the police or report at cybercrime.pk. PTA and the telecom fraud unit have tools that individuals don’t need or can’t access.
“I need to verify customer data my company purchased” — tell the company to drop the purchased list and verify through legitimate PTA/operator channels instead. Using leaked data exposes the company to PECA prosecution.
“I need to find someone’s number” — if it’s for a legitimate reason (serving legal notice, returning a found phone), use the 667 method, contact the police, or go through a court process. For the full treatment of what’s legally possible when identifying a number’s owner, see CNIC details by number. Using leaked data is faster but illegal.
If you’ve found excess SIMs on your CNIC through an official audit, the correct action is to deactivate extra SIMs in Pakistan through the relevant operator — not to cross-reference against purchased databases.
Frequently asked questions
- Can I buy a real-time SIM database for Pakistan?
- No. PTA and operators don’t sell live SIM databases to individuals. What’s sold is recycled old data, leaked internal exports, or IMSI traces with guessed ownership. All carry legal risk under Section 6 of PECA 2016.
- How do I check if a SIM database is actually fresh?
- The only reliable check is 667 (MNP lookup) or cnic.sims.pk for your own CNIC. Any purchased database that differs from 667’s result on that SIM is stale or inaccurate.
- What is the most recent SIM database for Pakistan?
- The most recent authoritative data is what you get from 667 or 668 or cnic.sims.pk on any given day. That’s as fresh as it gets. Anything else is old.
- Is using a leaked database illegal?
- Yes. Section 6 of PECA 2016 covers unauthorised access to data. Possession and use of leaked databases is prosecutable independent of the original leak.
- Can I get a list of all active SIMs on a specific network?
- No. That data is available only to the operator and to PTA. It’s not legally accessible to the public and isn’t available in any “fresh database.” What you can check is how many SIMs exist on your own CNIC across all networks.
- What about SIM database on the dark web?
- Same legal exposure. Using data from the dark web carries the same PECA Section 6 liability as using data from a broker site, plus additional exposure for accessing dark web markets. FIA’s cyber unit monitors dark web SIM database sales specifically.
- How do I verify a phone number’s owner legally?
- Use 667 (MNP lookup if you have that specific SIM), your own CNIC via 668 or cnic.sims.pk, or file a police FIR if you suspect a crime. These are the three legal methods. For a complete guide on what each method returns, see SIM details by number.
- What’s the difference between a “fresh” database and old data with cosmetic changes?
- In practice, none. Sellers re-date old databases and claim periodic updates, but without a weekly or daily feed from an authoritative source (which they don’t have), the data remains stale. The cosmetic refresh makes it seem fresh but doesn’t update the actual records.
Last updated: May 2026 · Verified against current PTA notifications and PECA 2016.